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Jan-Werner Müller’s (born 1970) political analysis of contemporary populism reached 
way beyond an academic audience with the publication of his short and punchy essay 
Was ist Populismus? Ein Essay in 2016.1 Perhaps because his work has been able to 
articulate the concerns of many liberal democrats, who see a real and present danger in 
the spectacular rise of various kinds of populism in Europe and the USA, Müller’s ar-
guments have been widely embraced, also here in Denmark. The debate initiated in the 
Danish media by Müller’s visit to Copenhagen in October 2016 was the impetus behind 
the interview published below, which was conducted in Vienna in early 2017. Here, the 
group behind the interview pursues some of the trajectories that follow from Müller’s 
arguments on populism. In the interview, Müller sustains his central idea that populism, 
in both its Left-wing and Right-wing versions, is a threat to representative democracy. 
Müller teaches politics at Princeton University and was, at the time of the interview, 




“When I rule, the people rule” 
 
Interviewers: In many ways, the label ‘populist’ is childless. Certainly, those who often 
are referred to as populists seldom call themselves populists. We would like, there-
fore, to start with the basics and ask you to define precisely what you understand by 
the term populism? 
 
Jan-Werner Müller: Contrary to what we read and hear virtually every day, not every-
body who criticizes elites – as the clichéd phrase goes – is a populist. Of course, when 
they are in opposition, populists criticize the government, but they also do something 
else: populists claim that they, and they alone, represent the people. That is the decisive 
																																																						
1 Was ist Populismus? Ein Essay (2016, Berlin: Suhrkamp). See also ‘What is Populism?’ (The Utopian, 
March 2011) and ‘Parsing Populism. Who is and who is not a populist these days?’ (IPPR, October 2015) 




criterion. And it clearly is not about policy content. For example, if you tell me what 
you think about immigration or the European Union, I am not able to tell immediately if 
you are a populist or not. It is a particular claim concerning representation, not a specif-
ic position on a policy issue. 
Populism is always detrimental to democracy in at least two ways. Firstly, it fol-
lows from its anti-pluralism that populists assert that all other contenders for power are 
essentially illegitimate. Again, this is never just a matter of disagreement about policy, 
which is of course perfectly normal in a democracy. No, the populist immediately 
claims that the issue at stake is entirely moral; and they make everything into a personal 
question: the others are bad characters, they are corrupt, they are crooked, they don’t 
work for the people, they work for the multinationals, or the EU, or what have you. 
Secondly, and perhaps less obviously, all those who do not share the views of 
the populist (and hence do not support the populists politically), can have their status as 
properly belonging to the people put into doubt. Thus, populists always perform two 
exclusions. One is at the level of the elites – that is, party politics, professional politi-
cians, and so on. The other is at the level of the people themselves, if you like. That is, 
populists claim that some citizens are not really part of the people. Last year Donald 
Trump2 said: ”The most important thing is the unification of the people and all the other 
people do not mean anything”. That’s what I am talking about. All the others, even if 
they have an American passport, do not truly belong, or so the populist decrees. So, it is 
not just anti-pluralism at the level of elites; it’s also anti-pluralism among the people 
themselves. 
 
So, just to be clear, people who say they are against the establishment also make a 
claim that they have a monopoly of representing the people. In doing so, do they try 
to deny the rights of others to belong to the people? 
 
Yes, for me the decisive criterion is that populists claim a distinctly moral monopoly of 
representation. Again, take Trump. I assume that his speechwriters did not try to con-
tribute to a political theory textbook on populism when they wrote his inauguration 
speech – but had they done so, one must admit that they succeeded brilliantly. Remem-
ber what he said in essence: “Today, power is given back to the people.” In other words: 
when Trump rules, the people rule. It is this equation that, to me, amounts to a claim to 
a monopoly of representation, which is peculiar to populists. 
All the other things that people mention when describing populism – criticizing 
the elites, ‘being against the establishment’ and so on – are not in and of themselves 
dangerous for democracy. On the contrary: any old civics textbook would tell you that 
good democratic citizens should be critical of the powerful, keep a close watch on elites 
in politics, the economy, culture, etc.  
 
																																																						
2 Elected president of the USA on November 8, 2016 and assumed office on January 20, 2017. 




What was the intellectual path that led you to work with the concept of populism? 
Who were the initial inspirations? 
 
I think I was originally puzzled by the idea of Left-wing populism. Was it possible to 
develop such a thing and why exactly would it be desirable? I also wanted to think 
about a notion often put forward by populists themselves, namely the claim that they are 
the real defenders or even today’s only authentic promoters of democracy. And some 
observers – who are not populists themselves – advance a conceptual split according to 
which the populists are illiberal democrats and maybe some of the elites are undemo-
cratic liberals. But can democracy really benefit from populism?  
I was intrigued by these kinds of questions, but contrary to what I read about 
myself sometimes now, I’m not an expert on populism. There are people who have been 
studying these parties and movements in great empirical detail – I cannot possibly offer 
what they can offer. I learned tremendously from people who really are experts like Cas 
Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser.3 But I hope that my take on populism has been 
useful as a contribution to democratic theory and that, perhaps, it might also inspire 
further empirical research. At the same time, I generally have argued against the case 
for Left-wing populism that has been put forward by Ernesto Laclau4 and Chantal 
Mouffe5. 
 
What was your aim in writing ‘What is Populism?’ Did you achieve the goal? 
 
I think it’s best to leave judgments like this to readers. Well, one aim was to offer some 
kind of understanding and, more particularly, a set of distinctions as well as an exami-
nation of the dynamics of populist regimes. In the European context, in the public de-
bate, you often get the feeling that everybody is a populist and everything is populism. 
Many movements and leaders have been pigeonholed together – either because politi-
cians, journalists, and academics are lazily following received opinion or because they 
actually have an ideological agenda and seek to discredit certain parties by grouping 
them with populists (given that, in Europe, populism, unlike in parts of US discourse, 
mostly has a bad name). 
I was, for instance, struck by announcements from representatives of the Euro-
pean Union, who at one point said that there are populists on the Left and on the Right 
and that they are all dangerous and fundamentally anti-European. I thought it was im-
portant to hold on to some distinctions, to say, no, not every protest is populist, not eve-
ry protest is a threat to the system, some protests can be healthy and productive. We do 
																																																						
3 Cas Mudde (1967), Dutch political scientist and populism expert who teaches at The School of Public 
and International Affairs, University of Georgia. Wrote Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 2007. 
4 Ernesto Laclau (1935 - 2014), Argentinean political philosopher and political activist. He taught at the 
University of Essex, UK and is known for his work on hegemony and populism. 
5 Chantal Mouffe (1943), Belgian political theorist. Professor at the University of Westminster, London. 
She was originally inspired by Antonio Gramsci. Since the early 1990s, she has studied liberalism, ne-
oliberalism, and populism.  




not want to be in a situation where we say that we need to hold on to long-established 
parties in order to preserve our democracy – or else. Not all new parties or movements 
are threats to democracy. 
It can be fateful to collapse distinctions and dismiss new parties and movements 
as populist, because you send a message to the supporters of what are sometimes demo-
cratically productive movements or parties that basically we don’t accept anything new, 
there is no place in the system for them. It can give them the impression that the system 
is broken, and that you can’t do anything differently in what critics sometimes call tech-
nocracy or post-democracy. They are quickly labelled as anti-European if they want a 
different Europe or just different policies. Some are even equated in that way with Ma-
rine Le Pen6, who really is anti-European. 
I also worry about the way certain descriptions of ‘populism’ are accepted as 
valid, neutral, or quasi-objective by journalists. Many of us now take it for granted that 
there is something like a homogeneous ‘elite’ or ‘the establishment’ and that everyone 
is fed up with them and are revolting against them and so on. This is already talking 
populist language; many populists do not represent ‘the people,’ but at best a third of 
the electorate. We should not buy into this simplistic narrative which populists them-
selves are suggesting, especially if the ‘rise of populism’ is presented as something ab-
solutely inevitable. 
Another example is the idea that populists always necessarily have simplistic 
policy proposals. Some people say this without any kind of neoliberal policy agenda, 
but some advance this claim because they want to discredit any other political options. 
It is easy to discredit somebody who criticizes you, if you say that they are populists, so 
they must be like Le Pen or Orbán7 or Trump and therefore they must be dangerous. 
So, these were some of my intentions. Again, I leave it to you to judge whether 
they were realized or not. On a self-critical note: The question I often find most difficult 
to answer is what do we do in response to populism? I stick to all the answers in the 
book, but I think that this is also the area in which I have been pushed to develop new 
answers since the book came out. 
 
 
Populism and the liberal democratic order 
 
I guess you would agree that the concept of ‘the people’ is operational in both de-
mocracy and populism. Nevertheless, you seem to suggest that populists misuse the 
concept of the people, but that the democrats don’t. Can you elaborate? 
 
Well, I would rephrase the question. First, I do not think that anybody should have a 
special privilege to say what the people really is and that other conceptions are wrong, 
																																																						
6 Marine Le Pen (1968), leader of Front national. Member of the French parliament. Daughter of Jean-
Marie Le Pen. 
7 Viktor Orbán (1963), Prime Minister of Hungary.  




or that somebody necessarily misuses the term ‘the people.’ The concept of the people 
is always up for grabs, and democracy is also about a permanent contestation of what 
democracy is, as the French theorist Claude Lefort (1924-2010) often pointed out.  
Moreover, we all have a right to go to the streets and claim that we can represent 
interests and identities, which have as yet not been properly represented. But this is dif-
ferent from someone claiming that they and only they represent the people, or what 
populists often call ‘the real people’ (notice again the exclusionary implications – some 
people do not form part of the people, even though to the innocent observer it might 
seem so). Also, for populists the people are always homogenous. And this is empirically 
not true, obviously. As Habermas8 once put it, the demos can only appear in the plural. 
When a ‘normal’ democratic politician looks at society and says, ‘this problem 
has not been addressed before’, certain citizens’ interests and identities have not been 
properly represented, the 'normal' politician treats those claims to representation as hy-
pothetical, as essentially fallible. If it turns out that nobody is following their lead, they 
say, ‘Ok, but we don’t give up, we will reframe our appeal, we have just got to mobilize 
better’ and so on. Whereas the populist, not always but typically, is going to say, 
‘Somebody has prevented the real people, the silent majority, from expressing itself.’ 
Again, the obvious example is Trump, who in effect said during the campaign, 
“If she wins, it was probably rigged”. It is one thing if populist leaders say that. It’s yet 
another thing if 70 percent of self-identified Republican citizens believe it – a bad sign 
for any democracy. In that sense, populists do something that ’normal’ politicians do 
not do – they constantly erode the trust in democratic institutions.  
I hasten to add that, of course, any of us can criticize our democratic institutions; 
they are not sacrosanct. There might be many good reasons to say that our election sys-
tem is flawed, or that our system of party financing is problematic, or whatever it might 
be. But that is not what the populists say. The populist effectively says: ‘If I don’t win, 
the system is flawed.’ That is not a democratic argument.  
 
Would you agree, seeing that the notion of the people is common to both populists 
and democrats, that the danger of populism is inherent to the democratic order? 
 
Yes, I would agree with that. Although, if you find anything plausible in my theory, it is 
specifically about representative democracy. In Athens, you could have had dema-
gogues, you could have had rabble-rousers, but you would not have had populists as I 
describe them, because you would not have had the principle of representation at the 
core of the democratic order. So, in that sense, yes, it is a permanent danger, which also 
means that we can never get rid of it. As long as we have representative democracy 
somebody can make populist claims. It does not mean that they will be equally success-
ful, but it is not something we can exclude for good. It is a further question why some 
populist claims resonate more at certain times than at others. 
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In your book, you dismiss both what you call a political-sociological diagnosis and a 
social-psychological diagnosis of populism. The former refers to attempts to explain 
populism by reference to a threatened lower class and middle class and the latter to 
suggestions that populist anger is a simplistic response, which misunderstands its tar-
get, in the same way that August Bebel9 once claimed that antisemitism is socialism 
for dummies. But, if you dismiss these explanations, how then would you account for 
the contemporary surge of populism? 
 
I would say two things. First, I am struck by the fact of how easily we liberal democrats 
buy into the populists’ own narrative. We are always saying that populists are not trust-
worthy, that their ideas are too simplistic, and so on. But when they offer us a one-line 
explanation as to why they are being successful – things like ‘it’s all about the losers of 
globalization’ or ‘the working class don’t like foreigners anymore,’ we often immedi-
ately buy into these stories. Why? Because we seem to want an easy life, too, and rest 
content with simplistic, one-dimensional explanations. That does not answer your ques-
tion, but I wanted to mention it, because it is surprising that people who generally do 
not believe a word the populist say immediately think they are right on the reasons for 
their own success. 
Also, we would never accept such simplistic explanations concerning other 
kinds of political parties. We do not think that voters of social democratic parties all 
have exactly the same interests and the same motivations, belong to precisely the same 
class or are exactly in the same psychological state. We would at least think from the 
start that we are dealing with a heterogeneous coalition of interests and identities and 
that the support for the party depended on how it presented itself, and so on. Trivial, I 
know, but with populists we all of a sudden forget such basics. 
The second thing is that, from my theoretical point of view, in one sense popu-
lism is the same everywhere, because all populists make the same moral claim that they 
alone represent the people. But it doesn’t follow from this that the causes of populism 
are the same everywhere. Again, we make it easy for ourselves if we say, oh, we have 
this populist phenomenon everywhere on the global level so it must be the same causes 
everywhere. But of course, this doesn’t follow. I have not studied these cases in any 
great empirical depth, but it seems clear enough to me that national contexts matter a 
great deal. The reasons for the rise of Jörg Haider10 are not the same as the reasons for 
the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen11, which are again not the same as the reasons behind the 
rise of Donald Trump. 
In other words, the causes can be very heterogeneous. It seems to me naive to 
think that there is just one kind of populist voter and that if we magically could find his 
																																																						
9 August Ferdinand Bebel (1840-1913) was a German politician and labour leader. He was the first 
chairman of the Social Democractic Party of Germany. 
10 Jörg Haider (1950-2008) is the former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party.		
11 Jean-Marie Le Pen (1928) is the founder of the French extreme right-wing party Front National and 
father of its current leader, Marine Le Pen. 




or her sorrows and grievances, then the whole sordid phenomenon of populism would 
just go away. 
What this also implies – something a lot of people don’t want to hear – is that 
we need to distinguish between particular policy content and populism as such. Racism 
and nationalism are not the same as populism. To be sure, Right-wing populists do draw 
on racism and ethnic nationalism, but analytically, it is possible to distinguish between 
content and form. In other words, it is at least theoretically possible for a populist, let’s 
say far-Right party, to get rid of populism and still have the same views on racism and 
nationalism. 
This brings up a difficult issue. I think that if we accept pluralism, it also means 
that we must engage with things we don’t like morally and politically – fighting against 
them with the best arguments we can muster, but also accepting their place in a demo-
cratic system. For instance, within a democratic spectrum, there can be space for parties 
and politicians who advocate minimizing immigration and very conservative family 
policies. At least, as a democratic theorist, one must say that this can be part of legiti-
mate pluralism, as long as these parties cease to be populist, that is to say, do not claim 
a moral monopoly of representing the people (and do not talk about immigration in a 
way that incites hatred of minorities). 
The problem with this nice or not so nice story is that I can’t think of any popu-
list parties that have ceased being populist. The example I sometimes hear – you proba-
bly know much more about this – is the Norwegian Progress Party. From what I under-
stand, it’s not true they are not populist anymore. That they are in government does not 
mean that they are not populist. 
So, we are talking about a possibility, but not necessarily a reality. It is easy to 
see why. For instance, if you were Marine Le Pen now, why should you cease to be a 
populist at this moment? Things are going extremely well [this was said before the 
French presidential elections, ed.], and you know that if you change your politics and 
conceded the fundamental legitimacy of the other parties, then that would probably 
cause a bit of cognitive dissonance. 
 
I guess what we are trying to hang on to is an explanation for the preference for popu-
lism, which would have the same theoretical status as the psychological and social 
explanations, which you seem to dismiss in your book. Beyond a reference to a con-
textual description, is there a way of theoretically accounting for why a given voter 
chooses populism?  
 
I’m not saying that we can’t learn from these approaches. What I am saying is that we 
have to be very careful with such psychological generalizations, because we open a 
door through which all the clichés of 19th century mass psychology re-enter; according 
to these, the irrational masses are always waiting to be seduced by some great dema-
gogue. 




Again, we make it too easy for ourselves, if we just assume that people are all angry and 
resentful and then stop with that supposed fact. We should have known from Aristotle 
onwards that people are not just angry for no reason. Very often it has to do with feel-
ings of righteousness, of unfairness, and injustice. If we stop with facile mass psycholo-
gizing, we never get to the point of asking why people are, in fact, angry. Their answers 
might not be convincing, but we should at the very least hear what they are. 
Still, you are right to say that we need to discuss more general explanations and 
not just say that it is all entirely contextual – though, to be sure, in all likelihood we 
have a complicated combination of various factors; it is not just one cause that explains 
everything. So, context is not a meaningless answer.  
But you are going to press me again and rightly so. So here is what I can come 
up with as a theoretical answer, which is present also in the book, but not very much 
developed there: I think that our time is characterized by an increasing conflict between 
those who want more openness (which takes the clichéd versions of economic and cul-
tural globalization, but can also mean the recognition of ethnic, sexual, and religious 
minorities in one’s own country – in other words, it doesn’t have to be something to do 
with the international) and those who want more closure. In this conflict, the populists 
appear as actors who have answers ready; after all, they always do identity politics and 
they have an account of who the real people are, about who belongs and who doesn’t. It 
does not mean that they are right, but this is an issue where they can say something. 
If our central problems were different – if we were talking much more about bio-
ethics or if we actually took global warming seriously – I don’t think populists would 
have much of a prominent role. In those debates, they can try to discredit and delegiti-
mise the experts, but beyond that, they probably would not have much of substance to 
say. But, concerning the conflict around globalization, openness or closure, which I 
think is now as real as the conflict between capital and labour, between the countryside 
and the city, they have something to say. It provides them with an opening in a way that 
other conflicts do not. 
 
Would you allow for the possibility that a populist party or movement could, in fact, 
internally display a very high degree of pluralism? In other words, that a party or a 
movement might have an anti-pluralist approach to the existing order and a very an-
tagonistic relationship to it, while at the same time, internally, it might display a very 
high degree of pluralism? Do you think it is possible, under certain circumstances, that 
what we call a populist force might, in fact, be a pluralist society in waiting? 
 
It is a very good question and I have two remarks in response. Firstly, there is no law 
that says that populist parties can’t have internal pluralism. But, if you follow my ap-
proach, it is very unlikely because the starting point for populists is always that there is 
a singular authentic popular will based on the idea of a homogeneous people. So, popu-
lists would generally say: ‘What’s there to debate? We know what the real will of the 
real people is and, in fact, it should be obvious to everyone.’ They always know that 




authentic will in advance, because it is deduced from their symbolic construction of the 
real people – which, by the way, is a purely theoretical exercise, no actual input from 
the people is needed. It is very unlikely that we will have a vibrant internal debate, 
where at a party conference they will debate endlessly about what the single authentic 
will really is. We do not see the Orbáns or the Erdogans12 of this world having a plural-
istic, democratic internal life in their parties. But, I would not say that it is, by defini-
tion, totally impossible. 
My second remark would be in response to critics saying: ‘Look at Podemos and 
Syriza, they have a lot of internal democracy, they are pro-refugee, they are pro-LGBT, 
and this shows that they can’t possibly be populist.’ That for me would be insufficient. 
The question basically is whether they make that central claim of a moral monopoly of 
representation or not? If they say that only they represent the true people, then it does 
not really matter, because the question is how you position yourself vis-à-vis other con-
tenders to power and vis-à-vis citizens that happen not to agree with you.  
 
We need to ask about the difference between Left-wing and Right-wing populism. 
 
The difference has to with the actual political content, the material from which a claim 
to a moral monopoly of representation can be derived. Contrary to what I sometimes 
hear, it is not by definition impossible to have Left-wing populism. There are some who 
say that this cannot happen, because the populists are the bad guys and the Left are, by 
definition, the good guys. But no, it is possible. Chávez13 is the obvious example of an 
actual Left-wing populist – there came a point at which it was simply illegitimate, per 
definition, to disagree with Chávez. You immediately became a traitor to the real Vene-
zuela, to the project of twenty-first century socialism etc. 
 
We would like to discuss the liberal democratic order that the populists claim to be up 
against. Do you think there is any merit to the argument made by many contemporary 
populists that the liberal democracies have not delivered? 
 
Forgive me again for giving a very boring answer, but the only honest answer is: It de-
pends! Again, we want easy answers and this kind of economic reductionism provides 
an easy answer. If it were true that populism is all about economic inequality and stag-
nation, then Geert Wilders14 would not be where he is now. Then we would see an ex-
plosion of populism in Ireland or Portugal, both of whom suffered tremendously during 
the Euro Crisis – but we just don’t see those things. So, there is no easy account that 
says that economic crisis results immediately in populism. 
																																																						
12 Recep Tayyip Erdogan (1954), president of Turkey since 2014 and leader of the populist and Islamist 
AKP party. Former prime minister. 
13 Hugo Chávez Frías (1954 – 2013), President of Venezuela from 1999 to 2013. Often labeled left popu-
list by friends and foes alike. 
14 Geert Wilders (1963), Dutch opposition politician and member of the parliament since 1998. He is 
leader of the Right-wing Partij voor de Vriheid. 




Let me go back to something I touched upon at the beginning. Whether you can make a 
case against the elites in an economic crisis is very contextual; and I don’t think that we 
can use a simplistic model along the lines of, ‘It’s the economy, stupid,’ or more or less 
politely say that ‘populism is socialism for idiots.’ 
We should also not forget that some populists, like Hugo Chávez, in the begin-
ning made very plausible claims about people’s exclusion from a particular political and 
economic system. It would be crazy to claim that, for instance, Turkey was a wonderful-
ly open and pluralistic society and then the mad Erdogan came and destroyed it all. The 
same with Chávez: of course, there were social exclusions and tremendous injustices in 
Venezuela. There are reasons why people end up like populists in certain times. There 
are times where people don’t start out as populists, but become radicalized. It partly 
depends on the responses they get from other actors – such as existing powerful parties, 
judges, etc. We can’t say from the beginning how things will end up. Maybe Chávez 
would have become a populist under any circumstances and maybe he would not.  
 
A final theoretical question before we move onto the next focus area: Would you be 
prepared to inscribe populism as a stage in process of political change, so that one 
could say, for example, that populism emerges at certain ‘stages’ of democratic de-
velopment, or that certain ‘historical conjunctures’ make it more likely than others?  
 
I am sceptical of those kinds of theories, at least in relation to populism. That does not 
mean that populism is a random or mysterious phenomenon. There are some factors that 
play a role. I mentioned the role of the cleavage vis-à-vis globalization. If this is correct 
we should not be surprised to see a certain type of identity politics coming out in the 
open now. 
But this is very different from saying that there are patterns over time so that you 
can tell the same story for all countries. In the US, for instance, it is fair to say that 
Trump would not have happened without the extreme partisanship of the Republican 
Party over the past 25 years. What explains his success is not some inevitable ‘wave’ of 
populism everywhere. It is that 90 percent of self-identified Republicans voted for 
Trump. If he had not been the Republican candidate, but a third party candidate, let’s 
say leading a new grassroots movement of angry white workers, he would not be presi-
dent today. Plenty of Republican voters seem to have said to themselves: ‘Yes, he’s a 
little crazy, but I can’t possibly vote for the other side.’ That kind of partisanship did not 
come out of nowhere. So yes, there is a story, but this story cannot be generalized. 
 
 
Neo-Liberalism and the Populist Challenge 
 
One of your main criticisms of populism is its anti-pluralism. Could we apply the same 
criticism to neoliberalism, especially as it has been expressed in recent years through 
the macro-economic policies of the EU under the label ‘austerity’? Some critics have 




claimed that these policies defend themselves simply by saying that "there is no alter-
native" (TINA). Is this not also an example of anti-pluralism?15 
 
As I say in the book, one of the problems with technocracy is that they make it easier 
for populists to say, ‘Look, where are the people in all this?’ Technocrats in effect claim 
that there is only one rational solution and we, as citizens, just have to consent to it. If 
you don’t agree, you are irrational; debate is unnecessary; no other solutions are availa-
ble. That kind of discourse makes it easy for populists to say, ‘I thought we had democ-
racy, which means having choices.’ But the twist of the argument is, as you rightly ob-
serve, that even if they seem to be extremes opposed to each other, technocracy and 
populism also have something in common: The technocrats say: ‘there is only one ra-
tional solution,’ while the populists say: ‘there is only one authentic, popular will (and 
only we know it).’ Everything between the two extremes disappears - and everything in 
between is, at least in my understanding, democracy: debate, persuasion, a chance to 
have a real choice.  
That also makes it plausible to say, contrary to what we hear now about an om-
nipresent crisis of representation, that there are counter-examples where this in-between 
space, democracy has become strengthened. And as a result, more people seem again to 
be willing to accept existing democratic institutions. There is no break here. For exam-
ple, whatever you personally think of Syriza and Podemos, their success makes it more 
plausible for people to say to themselves, yes, there are really options. There is a choice. 
And because they have the option to make their option as strong as possible, citizens are 
also more willing to say, ‘OK, we lost, Podemos is still not in power, but we can try 
again and are prepared to live with the outcome until the next elections.’ But, if I feel 
that it is post-democracy all the way down and that there is no alternative I can vote for, 
it is much more likely that I will turn away from the political system altogether. 
I think some of these outcomes have been far from obvious. It was far from ob-
vious, for instance, that young people in these countries left the squares and said, ‘Okay, 
we are going to build parties instead, based on our experiences.’ It would have been 
perfectly understandable if they had said, ‘Okay, if this is the system, I give up on it 
entirely. We will stay in the squares and give up on party politics completely.’ Or, an-
other option that one could have easily imagined in light of European history, would 
have been something like armed struggle – just think back to what some young people 
did in the 1970s. And instead they formed parties, which help to reflect the actual con-
flicts and cleavages in society. So, it’s hardly a homogeneous crisis of representation 
everywhere. 
Of course, you could reply to me: ‘I can vote for Tsipras16 ten more times, and 
nothing ever changes (in fact, it gets worse).’ True – but it is important to distinguish 
between some national systems, where things actually have changed, and the EU level, 
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where the conflict – for shorthand – between austerity and anti-austerity is not being 
reflected and up for any kind of sustained democratic contestation. It can be reflected in 
Greece and Spain, but it cannot be properly reflected in the EU as a whole. In other 
words, we have to be precise about where the crisis is, instead of having a lazy ap-
proach, which says, ‘Same crisis everywhere.’ We should not subsume everything un-
der the same concept and, for instance, say that protest parties are all dangerous. No, 
protest parties that accept the rules of the democratic system – which means not least: 
‘we accept it when we lose’ – are good news.  
 
Would you accept the argument that a certain dose of populism is healthy because it 
points to problems with democracy and that these problems can be made visible and 
thus corrected as part of an adaption to populism? 
 
No, not in the general way that this argument is usually presented. The standard variety 
of it would say, ‘Oh, yes, we don’t like their style, and it might be dangerous what they 
do, but we recognize that they have identified people's real concerns and real sorrows.’ 
The reason I would reject this is that it is based on a misunderstanding of how demo-
cratic representation works. It is not true that populists ultimately reveal the truth about 
what is happening deep down in society (even though again, in a strange way, it’s a real 
comforting story for us to say, ‘Yes, now we know what’s going on, because they have 
told us’). No, they have not. Because democratic representation is not some mechanical 
reproduction of given objective interests and identities out there, which parties merely 
transmit into parliaments.  
Instead, it is a dynamic process, where different offerings of representation and 
identification by politicians and parties can make a huge difference to how people per-
ceive themselves. An obvious example is that it is a big mistake to say, ‘Oh, Donald 
Trump has shown us that millions and millions of people in the USA are racists. Well, 
maybe we did not realize it before, but he has now told us the truth about American 
society.’ Now, of course it’s true that there are plenty of racists in the US and that he 
has managed to convince a lot of people – though not everybody who voted for him – to 
see themselves as de facto members of something like a white identity movement. But 
that was not inevitable. This is not the ultimate, objective truth about American society.  
So it’s a dynamic process. I’m not saying that anything goes, that anything can 
gain traction with voters; there must be something there on the basis of which populists 
are able to mobilize. But to jump from this to the statement that they have discovered 
the truth about people's real problems, and that we should accept what they tell us at 
face value, is a serious mistake. 
 
Sorry to return again to the issue of anti-pluralism, but we would like to press the 
point, seeing it is at the core of your conception of populism. For example, some 
would currently assert that there is a neoliberal hegemony, which prevents welfare 




states from being preserved. On the basis of this claim, could you say that the popu-
lists are right to say that the system itself is anti-pluralist? 
 
It’s true that the EU makes it more difficult to preserve welfare states; the goal of realiz-
ing a certain economic vision is indeed built into treaties. But I would not go so far as to 
say ‘the system itself.’ I think that too often the constraints placed by the EU on national 
systems are exaggerated. Let's not forget that politicians themselves often have an in-
centive to present their ideas in a much more technocratic way than they merit. It makes 
it easier for them. Rather than saying, ‘I’m responsible for this decision or that deci-
sion,’ it’s much easier for them to say, ‘I can’t do anything, Brussels told me to do it.’ 
For a politician, it’s much more tempting than to fight for more room of manoeuvre or 
to accept responsibility for actual choices. 
Again, there is a curious symmetry, when you think about it. The populist also 
say, ‘Look, I’m not responsible, I’m just implementing the people's authentic will.’ 
Both the technocrat and the populist deny actual personal responsibility. If things go 
wrong they can always say, ‘Sorry that we have a terrible recession. Brussels made me 
do it’; and failing populists can say, ‘I was about to implement the will of the people, 
but this judge prevented me from doing it’ or ‘The international financial elites prevent-
ed it from happening.’  
  
In some of the media commentary about the rise of contemporary populism, some 
very serious concerns have been raised and some very dramatic scenarios painted. For 
example, Robert Kagan17 and others have used the word fascism in relation to Trumps 
campaign. What is your assessment of the current conjuncture? In your opinion, is the 
situation dangerous? 
 
First of all, I would very much argue against the cliché that we are facing an irreversible 
process, a wave or even a “tsunami”, as Nigel Farage18 put it, that is, “washing away the 
elites” (or, a variation of the same theme: Marine Le Pen's domino theory). Nigel Far-
age didn’t bring Brexit about all by himself. He needed his very established British con-
servative collaborators like British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson19 and Michael 
Cove20. In the same way, Trump did not win the election as the leader of a third, insur-
gent, anti-establishment, populist party. He was the candidate of a very established par-
ty. Just as much as Farage needed his Boris Johnson, Trump needed his Christie21 and 
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Rudy Giuliani22 and, interestingly, his Newt Gingrich23 who is an intellectual by the 
standards of the American conservative movement.  
Long story short: nowhere in Europe or Northern America has a far-Right popu-
list come to power on his own. Austria would have been the first if Hofer24 had won the 
presidential election in 2016, but he didn’t. Every single case where these parties have 
had some success, Trump’s victory, Brexit – and Brexit is not a threat to the British 
political system like Trump is to the American political system – they had the support 
of their collaborators, and I use this word including its historical resonances, in the form 
of conservative elites. 
Therefore, it is a mistake these days to be fixated on the populists in isolation. 
There is a larger dynamic. We should keep a very close eye on conservatives in particu-
lar. I still find it hard to believe that, if conservatives in The Netherlands and France 
refuse to collaborate with these people that they will have great triumphs in the coming 
elections, let alone that Frauke Petry25 will be the chancellor in Germany.  
 
Nevertheless, let's take a look at the worst possible scenarios. Is liberal democracy 
able to defend itself against ’the populist surge’? Under these circumstances, which 
measures would you be prepared to endorse in the defence of liberal democracy?  
 
If you look at the American situation now, some of the liberals are extremely naive. 
Populists want conflict. They want confrontation. Ironically, they always talk about 
unification, but it is unification on their terms – if you do not unify according to their 
ideas, you are in for trouble.  
But democracy is not about unification. Democracy is about legitimately con-
tained conflict. It is a typical, clichéd American way of talking when US politicians say 
that the country is ‘so divided’ and that leaders, after all elections, have to heal the 
wounds of the nation. In a way, unification is way out of line in terms of a Madisonian 
understanding of democracy, which is not about unifying at all. It is precisely about 
enabling and maintaining conflict. As long as everybody acknowledges each other as 
legitimate opponents, democracy is in OK shape. 
It’s naive to think that as long as there is significant protest, Trump is failing. 
No. As long as he can portray protesters as a minority of people who are failing to de-
fend our homeland, there is trouble. Around 40 percent of Trump's voters get their news 
from FOX, followed by much smaller proportions that get their news from CNN and 
Facebook. The Washington Post and The New York Times are not even in the top ten 
for Trump supporters. So how these media see the protests is essentially irrelevant for 
Trump’s constituency. 
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Of course, it does not follow from this that we should not protest because we might see 
that protest incorporated into a Trumpist narrative. We should protest, but we should 
not be so naive as to think that it will translate immediately into something politically 
effective. 
There are two things I would add. In an EU context, there are actually mecha-
nisms available in the EU treaties. It is a tragedy and a shame that they have not been 
used. There are concrete things that could be done in the cases of Hungary and Poland – 
and, again, in the case of Hungary, it matters a great deal that supposedly mainstream 
conservatives have been covering for Orbán, who in effect is a far-Right populist. 
The tougher question is about the possibility, which exists in some countries, to 
prohibit parties altogether. I would say, although these populist parties are dangerous to 
democracy, this is not enough to legitimate party bans. But it puts even more of a bur-
den on politicians to respond to them in a way that makes it clear how populists under-
mine democracy, and that they are simply not like other contenders for power. 
